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ABSTRACT
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) methodology is employed to ascertain strategic insights 
into a serious conflict over environmental concerns connected to the expanded exploitation of oil sands at 
the Jackpine Mine Expansion project located in Alberta, Canada. In fact, the expansion of extracting bitu-
men from large tracts of oil sands in Alberta and its associated potential negative environmental impacts 
have received increasing attention at the global level. Accordingly, environmentally responsible extended 
mining of bitumen at the Jackpine site is urgently needed. Hence, the GMCR methodology and its associated 
decision support system GMCR II are utilized to systematically investigate the conflict of the Jackpine Mine 
Expansion project. The results imply that the Federal Government of Canada is more concerned about the 
economic benefits generated by the oil sands projects rather than environmental impacts. It is suggested that 
more effort should be devoted to the environment conservation by the government.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The oil sands are one of the most controversial 
energy resources in Canada. They create great 
economic benefits but at the same time could 
cause significant environmental damage. They 
also foster short term versus long term economic 
scenarios, depending on which stakeholders are 
the key beneficiaries (Marceau & Bowman, 
2014). Internationally and within Canada, 
environmental issues have directly resulted in 
protest over the oil sands development in general 
and specifically at the Jackpine Mine Expansion 
project. The dispute commenced when Shell 
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Canada intended not to fulfill its commitments 
with regard to the significant reduction of its 
greenhouse gas emissions.
To formally study the conflict of the Jack-
pine Mine Expansion dispute, the Graph Model 
for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) methodology 
is utilized. The dispute is divided into three 
phases because each phase involves different 
decision makers and corresponding options. 
Phase I commenced in 2007 when Shell was 
unwilling to implement its commitments of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and ended 
when a joint Federal Government of Canada and 
provincial Government of Alberta review panel 
was established in September 2011. Phase II 
ran from September 2011 until the joint review 
panel released a report in July 2013. Phase III 
started in July 2013 and concluded when the 
Federal Government issued a decision statement 
in December 2013.
This research constitutes an extension of the 
paper presented at the International Conference 
on Group Decision and Negotiation in 2014 
(Xiao et al., 2014). Based on the conference 
paper, more detailed information about the 
modelling of the dispute is provided and more 
in depth analyses are presented.
2. OIL SANDS DEVELOPMENT 
IN CANADA
Canada has always been considered a country 
having vast natural resources, especially oil 
resources. It is believed that Canada holds the 
second largest potential reserves of oil resources 
in the world, following Saudi Arabia, and 
most of the oil resources are contained in the 
oil sands. The major parts of the Canadian oil 
sands deposits are located in Alberta, Canada. 
It is estimated that there is a potential of 173 
billion barrels of bitumen that can be recovered 
from the Alberta oil sands, and they are primarily 
found in three main locations: Athabasca, Cold 
Lake and Peace River, as depicted in Figure 1 
(AER, 2014).
In recent years, the oil sands projects in the 
Alberta have expanded rapidly. Considerable 
economic benefits have been generated from 
the development of oil sands projects. It is 
expected that oil sands activities could create 
a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) benefit of as 
much as $885 billion, and a total government 
revenue of $123 billion between 2000 and 2020 
(Timilsina et al., 2005). It is also estimated about 
$25.2 billion was invested in oil sands projects 
Figure 1. Alberta oil sands areas (based on AER (2014))
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in 2012, and about $159.5 billion was invested 
in oil sands projects in Alberta from 2001 to 
2012 (Alberta Energy, 2013).
Coupled with expansion are concerns 
with respect to detrimental impacts on the 
environment, both locally and internationally. 
For instance, the building of holding ponds 
holding toxic waste could contaminate rivers, 
lakes, and aquifers. Furthermore, the release 
of greenhouse gases caused by the mining and 
upgrading of bitumen from the oil sands could 
significantly increase. There is also the issue of 
the large quantities of water needed to extract, 
ship and upgrade bitumen. Finally, there is 
the criticism of long term economic benefits 
to Canadians are not being taken into account 
(Marceau & Bowman, 2014). The Jackpine 
Mine Expansion dispute is concerned with the 
release of increased greenhouse gases due to 
the expansion of the project by Shell.
3. BACKGROUND OF 
THE JACKPINE MINE 
EXPANSION DISPUTE
The Jackpine Mine Expansion project is an 
oil sands mining project located about 70 km 
north of Fort McMurray on the east side of the 
Athabasca River, and it extends to the north of 
the current Jackpine Mine project. The location 
map of the project can be seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Map of the project location (based on Shell Canada (2007))
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On May 31, 2002, Shell Canada submitted 
an application for the Jackpine Mine-Phase I 
(JMPI) project. The JMPI initiative received 
regulatory approval by the governments of 
Alberta and Canada in 2004, and began op-
erations in August 2011 (Shell Canada, 2007, 
Christian, 2011). On September 18, 2003, Shell 
and the Oil Sands Environmental Coalition 
(OSEC), a non-governmental organization 
(NGO), reached a bilateral agreement which 
included commitments to significantly reduce 
greenhouse gas pollution from the JMPI proj-
ect. OSEC believed that the approval of the 
JMPI project was assisted by this agreement 
(Pembina Institute, 2009a). In December 2007, 
Shell submitted an application for the Jackpine 
Mine Expansion (JPME) project which would 
increase the production by 100,000 barrels of 
bitumen per day. The JMPE project was ap-
proved in January, 2009.
During the period from November 2007 
to January 2009, in written correspondence 
and face-to-face meetings, OSEC realized that 
Shell did not intend to fulfill its commitments; 
rather it planned to comply with future federal 
greenhouse gas (GHG) regulatory requirements 
(Pembina Institute, 2009a). OSEC believed that 
even if Shell were to comply with the federal 
GHG reduction requirements, Shell’s GHG 
pollution from these projects would increase 
by an estimated 900,000 tonnes without the 
commitments. OSEC was disappointed and 
decided to take action. On behalf of the OSEC, 
the Pembina Institute submitted a complaint to 
the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation 
Board (ERCB) and the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency (CEAA) on April 7, 2009. 
In the complaint, OSEC requested a new public 
hearing regarding the approval of JPME project 
because Shell reneged on written agreements 
with OSEC (Pembina Institute, 2009b).
On September 20, 2011, a joint federal and 
provincial review panel was established, and a 
public hearing was conducted on October 29, 
2012 in Fort McMurray, Alberta. Shell and 
OSEC both provided supplemental informa-
tion to the panel. On July 9, 2013, the Joint 
Review Panel (JRP) released a report claiming 
that there would be significant adverse project 
effects on certain wildlife and vegetation, but 
these effects could be justified. The project 
was recommended for approval with a series 
of recommendations (CEAA, 2013a).
The Panel’s report was taken into account 
when the Federal Government made a final 
decision. In particular, on December 6, 2013, 
the Federal Ministry of the Environment issued 
a decision statement declaring that the project 
might proceed in accordance with conditions 
set out in the statement (CEAA, 2013b). The 
Pembina Institute reacted to the decision on 
December 9, 2013, stating that it was disap-
pointed about the decision (Pembina Institute, 
2013). A lawsuit was filed to the Federal Court 
by the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation in 
January 2014.
Based on the background investigation, 
it can be seen that the dispute started in 2007 
when OSEC realized that Shell was not go-
ing to abide by its commitments. During the 
evolution of the dispute, decision makers and 
their options changed at different phases. As 
a result, it is reasonable to divide the dispute 
into three different phases, and each phase 
can be considered as a separate, but connected 
conflict model.
4. MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
OF THE CONFLICT
GMCR is a comprehensive and flexible meth-
odology for modeling and analyzing strategic 
conflict (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour & Hipel, 
2005; Hipel et al., 2013). This technique re-
quires relatively less information to construct 
a model: decision makers (DMs), options and 
preferences.
A decision support system called GMCR 
II was developed to assist the modeling and 
analysis of a strategic conflict. The structure of 
the decision support system is depicted in Figure 
3. The decision support system comprises three 
main components: a modeling subsystem, an 
output interpretation subsystem, and an analysis 
engine. The modeling subsystem is used to 
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deal with the modeling information such as 
DMs, options, feasible states, and preference 
rankings. Next, the modeling information is 
conveyed to the analysis engine to calculate 
stability for each feasible state for every DM 
according to a solution concept. More analysis 
such as coalition analysis and status quo analysis 
can also be performed by the analysis engine. 
Finally, the output interpretation subsystem is 
utilized to present the computational results 
such as individual stability, equilibria, and 
coalition stability.
4.1. Decision Makers and Options
DMs in a conflict would seek their own benefits 
based on the resources available. For instance, 
in the JPME conflict, Shell intends to comply 
with the future federal greenhouse gas regula-
tory requirements rather than the commitments 
to OSEC. This is economically beneficial for 
Shell since the commitments require Shell to 
reduce more greenhouse gas emission. On 
the other hand, OSEC is trying to protect the 
environment from the expanding oil sands 
development. These two DMs are involved in 
all three phases of the conflict.
More specifically, for the JPME Phase I 
conflict, Shell and OSEC are two of the key 
DMs. In addition, ERCB is another main 
DM. ERCB, as an independent agency of the 
government of Alberta, is authorized to make 
decisions on applications for energy develop-
ment, monitoring for compliance assurance, 
decommissioning of developments, and all other 
aspects of energy resources activities (AER, 
2013). ERCB granted the regulatory approval 
for the project in January 2009. It should be noted 
that ERCB has been succeeded by the Alberta 
Energy Regulator (AER) since June 2013, but 
during Phase I, it was still ERCB that was in 
charge. Hence, ERCB is considered as a DM.
During Phase I, Shell has two options 
which are negotiate with OSEC to reach a 
new agreement or insist on complying with 
the federal greenhouse gas regulatory require-
ments. For OSEC, there are two choices that 
can be performed, including negotiate with 
Shell or request a public hearing. The option 
for ERCB would be whether to hold a public 
hearing or not.
Once ERCB decided to conduct a public 
hearing regarding the project, a Joint Federal 
and Provincial Review Panel was established. 
Subsequently, the conflict turned into Phase II. 
During Phase II, one of the main DMs changed to 
the Joint Review Panel (JRP) instead of ERCB. 
JRP is an independent body, mandated by the 
Federal Minister of the Environment and the 
Chairman of the Energy Resources Conserva-
tion Board, to assess the environmental effects 
of the proposed project and review the applica-
tion (CEAA, 2013c). JRP’s responsibility is to 
make a recommendation regarding the project. 
At this point in time, Shell had no choice but 
to persuade the JRP to approve the original 
project. OSEC was in the same situation but 
the difference was to convince JRP to reject 
the project. JRP would review the additional 
materials provided by Shell and OSEC, and 
Figure 3. Structure of decision support system GMCR II (based on Fang et al. (2003a))
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make a recommendation to approve the project, 
modify the project, or reject the project.
After the JRP made a recommendation, a 
final decision should be made by the Federal 
Government. Then, the conflict turned into 
Phase III. During Phase III, the DMs changed 
to Shell, OSEC, and the Federal Government. 
Their options also changed. For the Federal 
Government, there are two options: 1) agree 
with the recommendation, and 2) reject the 
recommendation. Since JRP’s recommenda-
tion was to modify the project, if the Federal 
Government rejected the recommendation, this 
means the project was rejected. For Shell, the 
only option would be to accept the decision or 
not. OSEC also has only one option which is to 
accept the decision or not. However, if OSEC 
prefers not to accept the decision, it will protest 
against the decision, and if OSEC accepts the 
decision, then there will be no protest. There-
fore, the option for OSEC is given as “Protest” 
instead of “Accept”.
The DMs and their options for the three 
phases of the JPME conflict are summarized 
in Table 1. A dash “—” in the table means the 
corresponding DM is not involved in that phase.
4.2. Feasible States
An option means a possible action that a given 
DM may take. The selection of options under 
the control of a given DM forms a strategy. The 
combination of each DM’s strategy constitutes 
a state. Changes in the selection of options by 
a given DM will cause the state to change ac-
cordingly. A conflict with n options has 2n states 
in total. However, not all states are possible to 
occur in reality, the infeasible states should be 
eliminated. There are four types of states that 
might be eliminated (Fraser & Hipel, 1984): (1) 
logically infeasible states for a single player, 
(2) preferentially infeasible states for a single 
player, (3) logically infeasible states between 
players, (4) preferentially infeasible states be-
Table 1. Summary of decision makers and options in the JPME conflict 
DMs Phase I Phase II Phase III
Shell
1. Comply with federal 
requirements (Comply) 1. Continue the project 
(Continue)
1. Accept the decision 
(Accept)2. Negotiate with OSEC 
(Negotiate)
OSEC
3. Request public hearing 
(Request) 2.Against the project 
(Against) 2. Protest (Protest)4. Negotiate with Shell 
(Negotiate)
ERCB 5. Hold public hearing (Hearing) — —
JRP —
3. Approve the project 
(Approve)
—4. Modify the project (Modify)




3. Agree with the 
recommendation (Agree)
4. Reject the 
recommendation (Reject)
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tween players. For example, in Phase I, Shell 
will not choose its two options simultaneously, 
and must select at least one of its options. OSEC 
is the same. Moreover, ERCB will conduct a 
public hearing if and only if OSEC requests 
one. The elimination process leaves six feasible 
states in Phase I of the conflict, as shown in 
Table 2. In this table, the letter “Y” means the 
option is selected while “N” means the option 
is not chosen by the DM controlling it.
Similarly, the JRP can only select one of 
its options and must choose one from its three 
options in Phase II. The Federal Government 
must make a decision in Phase III. The fea-
sible states for Phase II and Phase III after the 
elimination of infeasible states are presented 
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
4.3. Preference Statements
Preferences are an important aspect in a conflict 
study, and preferences construction is a very 
challenging task. There are many techniques 
including quantitative and non-quantitative 
Table 2. Feasible states for Phase I 
DMs Options
Shell
Comply Y N Y N Y N
Negotiate N Y N Y N Y
OSEC
Request Y Y N N Y Y
Negotiate N N Y Y N N
ERCB Hearing N N N N Y Y
State Number 1 2 3 4 5 6
Table 3. Feasible states for Phase II 
DMs Options
Shell Continue N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
OSEC Against N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
JRP
Approve Y Y N N N N Y Y N N N N
Modify N N Y Y N N N N Y Y N N
Reject N N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y
State Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Table 4. Feasible states for Phase III 
DMs Options
Shell Accept N Y N Y N Y N Y
OSEC Protest N N N N Y Y Y Y
Federal 
Government
Agree Y Y N N Y Y N N
Reject N N Y Y N N Y Y
State Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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methods that can be used for preferences con-
struction. When the information is very limited, 
non-quantitative methods are considered a bet-
ter and easier way. Option prioritizing (Fang 
et al., 2003a) is one of the non-quantitative 
methods, and constitutes a realistic technique to 
employ for preferences construction. Under this 
technique, each DM has preference statements 
expressed in terms of options in the model, in 
which the preference statements are ranked from 
most important at the top to least important at 
the bottom. As is done in first order logic, a 
given preference statement can consist of any 
logical combination of options in which “and”, 
“or”, “if”, and “if and only if” connectives can 
be used. A negative sign in front of an option 
number means the option is not selected. For 
example, in Phase I, Shell most prefers ERCB 
not to hold a public hearing, as indicated by -5 
on the right side of Figure 4, next in importance 
is to comply with the federal requirements, as 
given by 1 in Figure 4. Shell’s least important 
preference statement is to negotiate with OSEC, 
as indicated by 2 at the bottom of Figure 4 on 
the right. As obtained by using the option pri-
oritization technique, Shell’s preference ranking 
of states from most preferred on the left to least 
preferred on the right is: (3, 1, 4, 2, 5, 6). OSEC 
prefers to request a public hearing as being of 
highest importance because Shell insists not to 
implement its commitments with OSEC. Then, 
OSEC would like ERCB to convene a public 
hearing if OSEC requests one. OSEC would 
also like to negotiate if and only if Shell is 
willing to negotiate. OSEC’s preference rank-
ing of states is: (5, 6, 1, 2, 4, 3). ERCB’s most 
preferred statement is that Shell and OSEC 
negotiate with each other. Next, it would like 
to hold a public hearing if and only if OSEC 
requests one. ERCB’s preference ranking of 
states is: (4, 3, 6, 2, 5, 1).
Similarly, in Phase II, Shell would like to 
continue the project the most, next Shell would 
like JRP not to recommend to reject the project. 
The least preferred statement for Shell is that 
OSEC keeps against the project. Therefore, 
Shell’s preference ranking of states is: (2, 8, 4, 
10, 6, 12, 1, 7, 3, 9, 5, 11). On the other hand, 
OSEC most prefers to against the project, and 
would like Shell not continue. Then, OSEC 
would like JRP to reject the project. OSEC’s 
preference ranking of states is: (11, 9, 7, 12, 
10, 8, 5, 3, 1, 6, 4, 2). JRP most prefers not to 
reject the project if Shell continues to provide 
additional materials. Next, JRP would not ap-
prove the project because of the opposition 
from OSEC. The preference ranking of states 
for JRP is: (10, 4, 3, 9, 2, 5, 1, 11, 8, 7, 6, 12).
Figure 4. Preferences construction for Shell in Phase I using the option prioritizing technique
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In Phase III, Shell most prefers that the 
Federal Government agrees with JRP’s recom-
mendation, and would like to accept the recom-
mendation if and only if the government agrees. 
The least preferred statement for Shell is that 
OSEC not protest. As a result, the preference 
ranking of states for Shell is: (2, 6, 1, 5, 3, 7, 4, 
8). Meanwhile, OSEC would like the Federal 
Government to reject the project. Then, OSEC 
prefers to protest if and only if the Federal Gov-
ernment agrees with JRP’s recommendation. 
Therefore, OSEC’s ranking of states is: (4, 3, 7, 
8, 5, 6, 2, 1). For the Federal Government, the 
most preferred statement is that Shell accept the 
government’s decision and OSEC not protest. 
Then the government would like to agree with 
JRP’s recommendation. The preference ranking 
of states for the Federal Government is: (2, 4, 
1, 3, 6, 8, 5, 7).
4.4. Stability Analysis
A state is stable for a DM if and only if the DM 
has no incentive to move away from the state. 
There are different types of stability definitions 
that are used to search for equilibria, including 
Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 1951), general 
metarationality (Howard, 1971), symmetric 
metarationality (Howard, 1971), sequential 
stability (Fraser & Hipel, 1979, 1984), limited-
move stability (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 
1993), and non-myopic stability (Kilgour et al., 
1987; Fang et al., 1993). The characteristics 
and descriptions of these solution concepts 
are summarized in Table 5. As can be seen 
in Table 5, Nash stability (R) has the lowest 
foresight while non-myopic (NM) has the 
highest, and the foresight level of limited-move 
stability (Lh) depends on the parameter h. It is 
noted that foresight means how many moves 
and countermoves a DM can think ahead. For 
example, one DM only considers one move 
ahead by himself under Nash stability. While 
with limited-move stability, one can entertain 
h moves and countermoves by the focal DM 
and the opponent. Under Nash stability, general 
metarationality (GMR), and symmetric meta-
rationality (SMR), less information about the 
preferences is required than the other three types 
Table 5. Solution concepts and behavioral characteristics (based on Hipel et al. (1997); Fang 
et al. (2003b)) 
Solution Concepts Foresight Knowledge of Preferences Description
Nash Stability (R) 
(Nash, 1950, 1951) Low Own






All of DM’s unilateral improvements 
are sanctioned by subsequent 





All of DM’s unilateral improvements 
are still sanctioned even after a 
possible response by the original DM.
Sequential Stability (SEQ) 
(Fraser & Hipel, 1979, 1984) Medium All
All of DM’s unilateral improvements 
are sanctioned by subsequent 
unilateral improvements by others.
Limited-move Stability (Lh)
(Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et 
al., 1993)
Variable All
All DMs are assumed to act optimally 
and a fixed number of state transitions 
(h) are specified.
Non-myopic Stability (NM) 
(Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et 
al., 1993)
High All
Limiting case of limited-move stability 
as the number of state transitions 
increases to infinity.
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of concepts, one DM only requires to know its 
own preferences.
A state that is stable for all DMs is called 
an equilibrium or resolution. An equilibrium 
provides a possible resolution to the conflict. 
The equilibria can be identified using the de-
cision support system GMCR II (Hipel et al., 
1997, 2008; Fang et al., 2003a, b). A screenshot 
of final equilibria for Phase I using GMCR II 
can be seen in Figure 5. DMs and their cor-
responding options are listed at the top left of 
the diagram, and at the bottom left is the list of 
solution concepts. If a state satisfies a particular 
solution concept, a checkmark is put at the cor-
responding intersection point.
According to GMCR II, as shown in Figure 
5, there are two equilibria for Phase I: a weak 
equilibrium (state 2) and a strong equilibrium 
(state 5). A strong equilibrium satisfies all so-
lution concepts listed in Table 5 for all DMs, 
and can be considered as a reliable solution 
for a decision making problem with a greater 
confidence. A weak equilibrium, on the other 
hand, only satisfies some solution concepts 
for all DMs. For instance, state 2 is not a Nash 
equilibrium, but is an equilibrium under other 
solution concepts listed in Table 5. Therefore, 
state 2 is referred to as a weak equilibrium. State 
5 indicates that Shell chose to comply with the 
federal requirements, OSEC was disappointed 
and requested a new public hearing, and ERCB 
decided to conduct a public hearing. Similarly, 
the single equilibrium for Phase II (state 10) 
indicates that Shell preferred to continue the 
project while OSEC preferred to be against the 
project. JRP recommended a modification to the 
original project. In fact, these results were the 
actual situations that happened in September 
2009 and July 2013, respectively.
The findings calculated by GMCR II indi-
cate that there are two equilibria for Phase III. 
If the Federal Government rejects the project, 
Shell would not accept the decision while OSEC 
would be glad to see this situation. If the Federal 
Government approves the project, OESC would 
be against the decision. In this case, the final 
result would depend on the preference of the 
Federal Government. In fact, the government 
approved the project in reality, which means 
that the government preferred the latter situation 
to the former one. A historical evolution of the 
dispute is illustrated in Figure 6. The diagram 
shows each DM’s response during each phase 
of the conflict.
Figure 5. Equilibria for Phase I
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4.5. Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis is a kind of investigation 
to determine how parameter changes in the 
model can influence the stability results. There 
are various types of sensitivity analyses in 
conflict analysis including preference changes, 
additions/deletions of DMs, option modifica-
tions, consideration of other kinds of human 
behavior, coalitions, misunderstandings, and 
entertainment of other modes to bargaining and 
negotiation (Fang et al., 2003b). As preference 
is an important part of a conflict analysis, pref-
erence change is one of the most crucial types 
of sensitivity analysis. In general, preference 
alternations can be done for more than one DM 
simultaneously, or for only one DM.
For example, if JRP cares more about the 
environmental issues, one would recommend 
not to approve the original project if there is 
opposition. If JRP cares more about economic 
benefits, then JRP would prefer to recommend 
approving the original project, and would rec-
ommend modifying the original project only 
if there is opposition. The preferences of the 
other DMs remain the same. The new prefer-
ence statements can be utilized for ascertaining 
equilibria using GMCR II. The new equilibrium 
state becomes state 8, in which Shell chooses 
to persuade JRP to approve the original project, 
and JRP recommends approving the original 
project although OSEC is against the project. 
A comparison of the initial equilibrium state 
and the new equilibrium state is shown in Table 
6. According to Table 6, the only difference 
between the initial equilibrium and new equi-
librium is the recommendation made by JRP.
5. INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSION
Economic benefits and environmental damages 
are two important sides of the rapidly expanding 
oil sands projects. A balance between these two 
Figure 6. Historical evolution of the JPME conflict
Table 6. Comparison between initial and new equilibrium states in Phase II 
DMs Initial Modeling (State 10)
Preference Change 
(State 8)
Shell Shell chooses to persuade JRP to approve the project.
Shell chooses to persuade JRP to 
approve the project.
OSEC Opposition is disappointed with the decision, and chooses to oppose.
Opposition is disappointed with the 
decision, and chooses to oppose.
JRP JRP recommends modifying the original project.
JRP recommends approving the original 
project.
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positions would significantly benefit having a 
more sustainable energy future. According to the 
results predicted by GMCR, one can presume 
that the Federal Government of Canada cares 
more about economic benefits than environ-
mental impacts. The position of the government 
results in massive protests and complaints from 
environmental organizations and Aboriginal 
people. Hence, the government should make 
sure that the oil sands projects are developed 
in a responsible manner and more efforts are 
placed on the environmental stewardship.
Moreover, a sensitivity analysis for Phase 
II suggests that there exists a certain DM who 
holds the balance of power (JRP in this case). 
Changes in the preference of this DM would 
vary the equilibrium of the conflict, while 
changes in the preferences of other DMs (Shell 
and OSEC) would not change the equilibrium. 
This information can be useful in understand-
ing the role of each DM in a multi-participant 
decision making problem.
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